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Integrating biosemiotics: 
From a semiological point of view 
Adrian Pablé1
Abstract. This paper is a study in the ‘philosophy of semiotics’. It is centred on a 
critical approach to the Peircean sign conception, which underlies biosemiotics and the 
global perspective on signs. The present discussion tackles questions of ontological 
and epistemological interest, which it does by taking a distinctly semiological point 
of reference. The semiology which the present critique draws inspiration from is Roy 
Harris’ integrationism, an approach to human communication which rejects Saussurean 
semiology – the common target of Peircean semiotics. Integrationism explains signs 
in relation to human activities. It shares with biosemiotics a view of reality as species-
specific, but takes a skeptical position towards the investigation of non-human signs on 
the grounds that it implies a metalanguage impervious to the radical indeterminacy of 
the sign. Integrationists take this indeterminacy as the starting point for their reflections 
on human communication.
Keywords: biosemiotics; integrationism; Charles Peirce; Roy Harris; semiology; 
philosophy of semiotics
1. Introduction: semiology vs. semiotics 
Adherents to a Peircean semiotics have long criticized what could rightly be called 
its sister discipline, Saussurean semiology, for its mistakenly treating the part as 
the whole, i.e. by committing the so-called ‘pars pro toto fallacy’. As Susan Petrilli 
(2011; 2015) has argued, semiologists have put the verbal sign on a pedestal, i.e. 
they assume verbal semiosis to be the model for all sign processes. Thus, Saussure’s 
programmatic statement that semiology would study signs “as part of social life“, 
as he famously put it in the Course in General Linguistics (Saussure 1983: 15), 
led to the assumption, in the wake of the Structuralist Revolution, that signs 
were ipso facto linguistic signs, which had no independent existence outside the 
abstract social structure to which they belonged. To Petrilli (2011: 297), the claim 
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that semiology is the general science of signs appears as incorrect and even as a 
“mystification”. Charles S. Peirce, however, developed a triadic sign model that was 
able to accommodate both natural and man-made signs, and no longer restricted 
‘communication’ to human (linguistic) communication. Semiotics, understood as 
the truly general study of signs, is Peircean in its orientation for that very reason. 
Thomas Sebeok (1979) saw the study of signs as transiting from “code semiotics”, 
centred on linguistics, to “interpretation semiotics”, which “also accounts for the 
autonomy and arbitrariness of nonverbal signs, whether ‘cultural’ or ‘natural’” 
(Petrilli 2011: 298).
 The present paper is a plea for semiology, though not in the traditional sense. It 
intends to introduce the Peircean semiotician to a different semiological approach 
than Saussure’s: one that fully acknowledges Saussure’s historical contribution to 
semiology but at the same time radically departs from its basic premisses and from 
its idealism. It is a semiology that is never (critically) discussed by semioticians 
as part of the semiotics–semiology controversy (e.g. Sebeok 1979; Deely 2003; 
Petrilli 2015), with the laudable exception of Paul Cobley (e.g. 2011a; 2014; 2017). 
The present contribution, it is hoped, will enrich the (yet to be invented?) field of 
philosophy of semiotics, i.e. it constitutes an opportunity for semioticians to defend 
their own views of the sign in light of the semiological considerations presented 
here. The semiology I am referring to relies on an integrational conception of the 
sign, as outlined in the many works of Oxford linguist Roy Harris (1931–2015). 
Said conception received its clearest formulation in a piece published within the 
collection Integrationist Notes and Papers (Harris 2009a). As a Saussure scholar and 
trained philologist, Harris was naturally interested in human signs, and linguistic 
signs in particular. However, in the late 1970s his linguistic thought developed in a 
different direction from mainstream linguistics, ultimately leading to an approach 
he chose to call integrational linguistics and integrationism. Harrisian semiology 
shares with its Saussurean counterpart a commitment towards human signs as well 
as an “anti-surrogational” view of signs, i.e. the rejection of the notion that a sign 
is something that “stands for” (or, is “a surrogate” of) something other than itself. 
This rejection is arguably what separates semiology from semiotics. It is also the 
reason why semiology is not part of semiotics from an integrational standpoint.
 While critiquing the Saussurean sign is relatively straightforward from a 
Peircean perspective – signs are not only conventional and in the possession of 
a collective unconscious: some signs are based on causal relationships or natural 
connections, whereas others are based on resemblance or imitation –, it is not 
quite clear how the Peircean scholar will (critically) deal with the sign as conceived 
by the Harrisian integrationist. Peirce’s sign is linked to the notion of semiosis, or 
as Deely (2009: 25) puts it, “the action of signs”. The Harrisian semiologist, in turn, 
 Integrating biosemiotics 127
does not view signs as ‘acting’ but as being made. This paper intends to initiate 
such a discussion – recent attempts at rousing the interest of semioticians have 
largely remained unreciprocated (Pablé 2016; Pablé, Hutton 2015) – by showing 
both the theoretical common and uncommon grounds between integrationism 
and a Peircean-inspired semiotics – as seen from an integrational point of view. 
The focus in the present contribution will be on biosemiotics as the successor 
discipline to semiotics (Cobley 2016), which recognizes that
not just a semiotics of human communication is needed, but, in addition to 
zoosemiotics, a semiotics of plants (‘phytosemiotics’), of fungi (‘mycosemotics’), 
and of the 3.5 billion year old global prokaryotic communication network within 
and between diff erent bacterial cells (‘microsemiotics, cytosemiotics’). (Cobley 
2016: 19)
As Cobley (2016: 18) further puts it, biosemiotics distances itself from a 
semiotics subject to the ‘linguistic turn’, which assumes that “much of human 
life is ‘constructed in discourse’”. Biosemiotics, in turn, proposes to study the 
human being endosemiotically, i.e. as a “mass of signs enacting message transfer 
nonverbally within the body” (Cobley 2016: 19). Conceived in this manner, the 
sign conception adopted in biosemiotics is antithetical to a Saussurean-inspired 
semiology. Deely (2009: 129), however, has called for an “amalgamation” of the 
Peircean and the Saussurean sign models, i.e., following Sebeok, he insists that 
semiology is part of semiotics, adding that the Saussurean notion of code (as an 
autonomous linguistic system) is indispensable for a conception of the linguistic 
sign as a triadic relation (Deely 2009: 130). In light of this, it is not clear whether 
biosemiotics constitutes a radical departure from structuralist approaches to the 
notion of ‘a language’. As Cobley (2014) has argued, semioticians have held very 
different views on ‘codes’ (both linguistic and non-linguistic). Generally speaking, 
however, semioticians seem to reject a purely code-based model of verbal 
communication, the latter being understood as much more than encoding and 
decoding linguistic signs that lead an existence separate from the material world 
(or rather: the ‘objective’ world), which makes a comparison with integrationism 
all the more compelling. In its anti-idealist position on reality, semiotics relies on 
a seminal distinction between ‘things’ and ‘objects’ (Deely 2003; 2009) in (rightly) 
promoting semiotics as the more advanced approach to reality than orthodox 
science.
 In this paper I shall pinpoint what I see as relevant differences between the two 
approaches under scrutiny, always in relation to their respective sign conceptions. 
My point of departure lies in questions in the philosophy of communication, 
which include numerous interdependent questions, among them ‘What is 
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communication?’ and ‘What is a sign?’. This particular focus is a consequence 
of the present article being written from an integrationist perspective, which 
takes an experience-based approach to human communication. It is an approach 
that is quite incompatible with any structuralist understanding. Any discipline 
dealing with communication and taking the sign as its central concept (as does 
semiotics, and, though more covertly, do most branches of mainstream linguistics) 
is discussed by the integrationist from a Harrisian semiological perspective. It 
is certainly not the only possible perspective, but one that still is still awaiting a 
serious critical response.  
2. The biosemiotic view
Biosemiotics is concerned with studying the communicative behaviour of living 
organisms. Following Sebeok, biosemiotics is synonymous with global semiotics, 
the study of the “life of signs” and the “signs of life” (Sebeok 1979). A seminal 
notion within biosemiotics is that of umwelt, as developed by biologist Jakob von 
Uexküll (1982), which has played a crucial role in the decentring of what Sebeok 
called ‘anthroposemiotics’. According to Uexküll, all species inhabit an ‘objective 
world’ – the ‘public’ world of a species, which is made of ‘objects’. Uexküll called 
this the species-specific umwelt. As already the seventeenth-century thinker John 
Poinsot pointed out (an insight further developed by philosopher John Deely), 
‘objects’ are always objects of experience, requiring awareness (they are mind-
dependent). The objective world is constituted by how the animal maps the world 
through its Innenwelt (the inner, subjective world) through which the meanings 
of objects are determined (via signs). The semiotician calls this mapping of the 
world ‘modelling’ (Kull 2010: 43). Thus objects are not by themselves objects, as 
Deely (2009) makes clear: they are ‘things’ which become objects every time they 
are experienced by a species through signs of their own (species-specific) making. 
 As Cobley (2016: 21) explains, Peirce’s definition of the sign as “something 
that stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (CP 2.228) 
parallels von Uexküll’s notion that signs are products of species-specific sensoria. 
Moreover, Charles Morris noted that Peirce’s “to somebody” also applies to 
members of a non-human species, i.e. to all living organisms (Petrilli 2011: 296), 
which logically follows from the premiss that signs are not an exclusively human 
phenomenon  – quite the contrary: according to biosemiotics, human signs, 
although occupying a special place in the ‘semiosphere’ (because of ‘language’), 
are marginal, both numerically and historically speaking. Distancing itself 
from Saussurean semiology, biosemiotics sees itself as much more ambitious in 
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scope, aiming to investigate how organisms ‘know’. It is the science of knowing 
in the circumstances that the species finds itself, and hence its goal of non-
anthropomorphic observation, i.e. investigation on the terms of the species 
(Cobley 2016: 39). The biosemiotician starts from the conviction that the Peircean 
triadic sign (sign–object–interpretant) is an “attribute of all life” (Kull 2011: 236), 
including human life. The emphasis in this sign model is, as Deely (2009: 154) 
explains, not merely between two elements (sign–object) in a dyadic relationship, 
but always also in relation to the mind/organism doing the interpreting (triadic 
relationship). This relation to the interpreter (human or non-human) makes an 
‘object’ out of a ‘thing’. Peirce’s sign conception is seen as depicting a universal 
semiotic reality, which at the same time reflects a historical reality: bacteria, for 
example, were engaged in semiosis (message exchanges) long before humans were.
 Concerning the object–thing dichotomy, it was John Deely’s (2009: 161) crucial 
insight that only humans can contemplate things in and for themselves, while non-
human species cannot reach beyond their ‘objective’ world, i.e. they cannot subject 
signs to analysis because they lack the kind of reflexivity humans possess. For non-
human animals, therefore, the sign and the object are one and the same, while only 
humans can become aware of their difference: animals are “semiosic”, but humans 
are also “semiotic” (Deely 2009: 162). However, not even humans can study pure 
things (in spite of what scientists believe), i.e. they cannot ‘overcome’ their own 
sensoria in their investigations of brute physical reality. While recognizing the 
complexity of the human umwelt and Innenwelt, which includes, as Sebeok argues, 
‘language’ as the “primary modelling device” constituting the human Innenwelt 
(Petrilli, Ponzio 2011: 318), biosemiotics rejects human exceptionalism (and the 
humanist glottocentric position that goes with it) and instead invokes the anti-
Cartesian principle of continuity (synechism), which dissolves the (‘mystical’) 
differences between mind and matter, and ultimately between non-humans 
and humans. Human knowing, as Cobley (2016: 42) puts it, is continuous with 
semiotic processes in other organisms. Following the same logic, the principle also 
dictates that a global semiotics be concerned with semiosis (continuity across the 
realm of nature) rather than with the individual sign (Cobley 2016: 25). 
 The biosemiotic view of what it means to be human and a human subject 
seeks to invalidate the Cartesian perspective and implement the endosemiotic 
perspective. As Jesper Hoffmeyer (1996: 23) argues, the human being is, in fact, 
“the product of a collaboration between possibly hundreds of trillions of bacteria”, 
adding that these bacteria “collaborate on the job of being human” (Hoffmeyer 
1996: 124). Based on this, Cobley (2016: 46) remarks that individualism is an 
untenable idea (citing Peirce’s outright rejection of the common belief in unique 
individuality): in fact, being constituted by endosemiosis, humans are seen 
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as “subject to collectivity” (Cobley 2016: 47). Moreover, humans are always 
also subject to an ‘other’; or to put it in Peirce’s terms, “your neighbors are, in 
a measure, yourself ” (CP 7.571). As Cobley (2011b: 107) notes on that score, 
Sebeok considered interpretation always in relation to an ‘other’. Moreover, 
Sebeok had no qualms about extending the notion of the ‘self ’ (and a sense of 
self) as well as the act of interpretation to non-human creatures. In the human 
realm, he distinguished between the biochemical self (with semiotic overtones) 
and the social self (with a biological anchoring), neither of which exist in isolation. 
The ‘other’ that the self relates to is not an option (which one chooses to enter 
in dialogue with) but an inevitability. Sebeok’s vision of the self emphasizes the 
confluence of both natural and cultural processes – a rejection of the idea that 
the self is merely constructed through language and discourse. Being deeply 
anti-humanist, biosemiotics denies that agency and intentionality are exclusively 
human attributes. If they were, how could other organisms be sign-makers (or 
sign-users), i.e. communicate via signs? In view of this, it comes perhaps as no 
surprise that biosemiotics applies the notion of ‘activity’ very broadly, saying of 
both bacteria and humans that they engage in activities which presuppose signs 
and interpretations. Human knowledge thus comes to be seen as the product of 
endosemiosic activities (Deely 2009: 132), including the human mind.
3. The integrationist view
Harrisian integrationism, discussed most thoroughly in Harris’ two consecutive 
book Signs, Language and Communication (Harris 1996) and Introduction to 
Integrational Linguistics (Harris 1998), takes a view on signs and sign-making that 
is altogether humanist. However, unlike traditional humanism, it is not elitist – 
it is ‘lay-oriented’ in a particular sense (Pablé 2019a). Harris rejects many of 
the traditional notions about human communication and the role of ‘language’ 
and ‘languages’ associated with humanism, referring to them collectively as 
the Language Myth (Harris 1981). However, his critique of what semioticians 
call ‘glottocentrism’ has a different angle. Harris argued that a theory of human 
communication that aspires to be a general theory needed to orient itself towards 
the goal of understanding linguistic experience from the inside, i.e. it should 
contribute towards self-knowledge rather than introducing abstractions that 
eliminate linguistic experience itself, as mainstream linguistics had arguably done 
(Harris 2010). In fact, mainstream linguistics, depite its claims to being a ‘science’, 
could actually be accused of harbouring a cultural bias in the way it investigates 
and describes human languages: thus while defining ‘languages’ as abstract systems 
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of signs shared by the members of a collectivity, it also proclaims the professional 
linguist to be an expert whose knowledge transcends the limitations of the lay 
linguistic user. The view of ‘languages’ as consisting each of identifiable (though 
only interdependently existing) abstract signs amenable to scientific description 
was indeed the result of a Western idea, originally developed in nineteenth-century 
Europe, modelled on the natural sciences, which, Harris (2005) has argued, are 
equally underwritten by the Language Myth. On this view, science is grounded 
in a Eurocentric conception of how language relates to the world, i.e. the belief in 
true names, which correctly identify the things they are names of, irrespective of 
contextual factors. 
 For the integrationist, in turn, there are no linguistic experts because there 
are no scientifically describable objects called ‘languages’ which define human 
communication for what it is. This means that the linguistic sign does not occupy 
any privileged place in integrationist theorizing – still, Harris insisted that an 
integrational theory of communication had to be semiologically grounded (Harris 
1996: 12). Integrationists focus on the notion of activity as a fundamental lay 
concept when it comes to understanding human communication, and theorize 
communication processes as consisting of activities that are integrated by means 
of contextualized signs of all kinds. The notion of a ‘linguistic sign’, as theorized 
in mainstream linguistics, is rejected by the integrationist as an unwarranted 
extrapolation detached from the concrete (first-order) sign-making processes 
individuals engage in, for whom the ‘linguistic’ and the ‘non-linguistic’ are not 
separate but always integrated domains of knowledge, as stated by the ‘principle of 
cotemporality’ (Harris 1998). 
 In other words, what matters in human life is that activities of whatever kind 
are integrated by whatever semiological means are available to individuals engaged 
in a specific programme in order to further their specific communicational 
objectives. A simple (imagined) scenario might help to clarify why integrationists 
hold communication to be radically open-ended: I hear the doorbell ring (an 
acoustic stimulus integrated by me and made meaningful) but I’m sitting at the 
desk writing the present piece (a programme of various activities I have been and 
currently am engaged in with a specific goal set in the near future), so I ask my 
son, who is sitting on the sofa playing Fortnite, to please go check who it is (the 
activity of saying something to someone else in the circumstances as they pertain). 
My son complies with my request (a disruption of my son’s programme of activities 
and taking up a new activity presupposing knowledge of what to do and the ability 
to exercise certain other activities: to be able to walk, to have the necessary height 
to open the door and knowledge of how to open it, greeting the other person, assess 
the situation, deciding what to do next, etc.). Unlimited possibilities arise out of the 
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scenario described above, allowing for various alterations: for instance, my son 
may be wearing headphones and not hear my request. I have to repeat it while 
speaking louder. Or it turns out that I only heard the doorbell ring after two failed 
attempts. I learn about it when opening the door myself due to my son’s refusal 
to comply. Perhaps my son did not hear it, either, or perhaps he did but did not 
bother to take any action. And so on. 
 Regarding the ontology of the sign, the integrationist holds that the signs made 
on the various occasions are unique. To some they were repetitions, to others they 
were not. In this respect, the integrationist does not accept that there are ‘facts’ 
(linguistic and otherwise) that can be established independently of the sign-makers 
themselves (Harris 1998). Crucially, however, even a sign repeated is, from an 
integrational semiological point of view, a creation ex nihilo: its creation occurs in 
a new situation, but its integrational function relies on its being construed by the 
sign-maker(s) as having a predecessor sign. The first sign (ringing the doorbell for 
the first time) and the second sign (ringing the doorbell for the second time) cannot 
possibly mean ‘the same’ for the person ringing (nor for the person hearing them). 
 In Harris’ view, signs are thus the products of contextualization: they both 
result from and facilitate the integration of particular activities in particular 
circumstances (Harris 2006). Integrationists recognize that we are always 
circumstantially determined, aware of ourselves, which is why the here-and-now 
is communicationally constrained for any individual by factors of three kinds, 
namely (i) biomechanical factors, which relate to the physical and mental capacities 
of the human being, (ii) circumstantial factors, which relate to the specifics of 
particular situations, and (iii) macrosocial factors, which relate to practices 
established in the community (Harris 1998: 29). Integration in any semiologically 
relevant sense is the individual’s continuous integration of (remembered) past 
and (anticipated) future with the here-and-now, which, the integrationist argues, 
cannot rely on a set of shared abstract signs but necessitates the making of signs. 
To manage the daily integrational tasks is to know how activities are temporally 
integrated in the macrosocial patterns of the community and to act accordingly 
(while acknowledging that not doing anything may also be a form of action). 
 Integrationists reject the two fallacies known as the ‘fallacy of telementation’ and 
the ‘fixed-code fallacy’, which explain the role of words as enabling speakers of the 
‘same language’ to transfer mental concepts from one mind to another, resulting in 
mutual understanding. In turn, the integrationist regards ‘languages’ and ‘words’ 
as second-order abstractions and hence as products of human communication – 
not its prerequisites. Since integrationists accept communicational activities of 
the first-order as the only reality, they view signs as spontaneous creations of the 
individual’s mind, i.e. they are, as Harris (2009a) puts it, radically indeterminate 
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(in both form and meaning). Harris (2006: 715) further says about the sign that 
“it exists as a construct by reference to which certain communicational activities 
[...] are integrated”, adding that apart from such activities “the sign as such has 
no existence”. All signs must be integrated ones because there is no sign without 
its personal maker. It follows that the integrationist rejects the substitute (or 
surrogational) sign (Harris 1996), i.e. the idea that a sign is anything that ‘stands 
for’ anything other than itself (a thing, an idea, a kind of behaviour) as well as the 
Saussurean sign, i.e. the idea that signs are defined purely internally by the abstract 
(linguistic) system to which they belong. The integrationist, in turn, stresses the 
temporality of the sign, and what it ‘means’ is always in relation to its integrational 
function, i.e. ‘meaning’ cannot exist as an abstraction. Harris, therefore, proposes 
a conception of the sign which is radical in many ways by proposing a semiology 
grounded in first-person experience. 
4. Human signs and non-human signs
Peirce’s dictum that “man is a sign” (CP 5.314) would be rephrased by the inte-
grationist as “man makes signs”, the reason being that signs cannot make signs. It is 
certainly true that living requires sign-making, and that the activity of interpreting 
coincides with one’s life, as Sebeok put it. To say of oneself, as Sebeok (1986) did, 
that one is therefore a verb (because of this activity of interpreting) – rather than 
a noun – comes close to committing the fallacy of verbalism that semioticians 
have so vehemently distanced themselves from: from an integrationist point 
of view, human interpreting is not ipso facto the domain of ‘language’. For the 
integrationist, many kinds of experiences are ‘prelinguistic’ – so-called not because 
they occur in the human’s early prelinguistic stage, but because they do not involve 
“linguistic communication” (Deely 2009: 156), but may be followed by a verbal 
exchange or by the activity of talking to oneself. Harris’ example concerns a visual 
experience, namely that of him looking out of the window and seeing a cat at the 
end of his garden (Harris 2009b). Self-understanding, for Harris, consists precisely 
in rejecting a ‘glottocentric’ view of ourselves, i.e. we are not “apes plus language” 
(Deacon 1997: 5), even though ‘language’ is without a doubt an important kind of 
integrated activity within the human umwelt. 
 For example, verbal communication enters the picture in the aforementioned 
scenario when Harris, on seeing the cat in his garden, turns to someone else in 
the room and informs him/her of it. What matters in this respect is that talking 
to someone else (dialogic communication) involves a very different order of 
integration and knowledge than observing (non-verbal self-communication). 
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Observing is not a form of self-talk. According to Harris, seeing a cat at the 
bottom of one’s garden is a personal interpretation of a visual stimulus and thus 
requires the making of signs. And this is where the Harrisian and the Peircean sign 
conceptions are at odds: to say that a sign cannot be a sign of itself, as Peirceans do, 
is not something that the integrationist would subscribe to, as the latter does not 
define the sign surrogationally, i.e. as anything that ‘stands for’ anything other than 
itself. In Harris’ example, observing is an activity one engages in against a certain 
macrosocial background (e.g. staring out of the window into the garden may not 
be considered polite, especially not when in somebody else’s home), under certain 
circumstances and through the exercise of certain biomechanical capacities (e.g. it is 
still daylight, Harris happens to be wearing his glasses, he happens to be standing 
by the window looking into his garden, the bottom of his garden happens to be 
near enough for him to recognise the cat, etc.). 
 Integrational semiology does not theorize signs as tripartite (sign–object–
interpreter) or internally relational, as the sign only exists to fulfill an integrational 
function for someone in the here-and-now. There is no further (more developed) 
sign triggered in the mind (interpretant) by the sign itself (representamen) because 
for the integrationist the sign itself does not exist. The rejection of the sign (in this 
Harrisian sense) is a direct consequence of treating signs as radically indeterminate 
in both form and meaning. The word sign itself is no exception to this. As Harris 
(2009a) makes clear – like Saussure before him – the human sign does not have 
a physical constitution: what we commonly call ‘signs’ (billboards, road signs, 
zebra crossings, etc.) are not signs from a (Harrisian) semiological point of view. 
Deely (2009: 162), concords, stating that signs are not a particular class of objects, 
though some material signs, in a Peircean framework, would count as potential 
human signs even before they are interpreted as such (Petrilli 2015). Moreover, 
Peirceans do not view the sign as belonging to the “sphere of the visible” (Deely 
2009: 143). The sign is said to be “invisible” because what makes the sign is its 
triadic relation, and relations are not perceptible to the senses. 
 However, in the Peircean model signhood inheres in the object (as a poten-
tiality) with respect to the already existing umwelten. Hence it is only a matter 
of time before something becomes a sign to ‘someone’. In fact, communication is 
not seen as radically open-ended in semiotics (as opposed to integrationism). The 
(material) object is a crucial component in the Peircean triadic sign conception, 
while for the integrationist signs are ‘internal’ creations by human sign-makers (a 
different conception of ‘invisibility’), while objects only have an existence as part 
of human activities (engaged in by particular individuals), which give rise to sign-
making. The exact identity of the objects, which is tantamount to stating what they 
are called correctly, is not necessarily pertinent to first-order integrated activities. 
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Signs exist for the sole purpose of integrating human activities that would 
otherwise (i.e. without those signs) remain unintegrated, and those activities often 
involve ‘objects’. The Harrisian semiological stance must not be mistaken for an 
idealist position, as the signs ‘integrate’ activities of both the ‘inner’ world and the 
‘outer’ world. Integrationism is thus grounded in the material world, but at the 
same time emphasizes that sign-making presupposes the individual human mind.
 From an integrational point of view, neither model, dyadic or triadic, can 
provide a satisfactory explanation of what a sign is because both models de-
contextualize the sign. In other words, they treat signs as separate from the 
activities that individuals are engaged in. What a sign is, the integrationist argues, 
cannot be answered from a third-person perspective, which makes the “scientific” 
study of human signs an impossibility: contextualization cannot be theorized 
beyond the lay observaton that if the signs I make are unique products of the 
present moment (in which certain activities are being pursued), everybody else’s 
signs must also be unique creations. What follows from this lay insight is the 
theorist’s rejection of the abstract sign (of whatever stamp). The conception of 
the sign proposed by Harris is “lay-oriented” insofar as its approach to human 
communication attempts to embrace the whole range of possible lay perspectives, 
but it arguably does not constitute a “lay theory”. Patently Harris’ explanation of 
what a sign is does not correspond in the least to how people would commonly 
use the English word ‘sign’. Surrogational sign models of a dyadic type, in turn, 
are much more in line with lay ideas about signs, catering to such commonsense 
questions as “Of what is this or that a sign?”. However, integrationism does not 
primarily target lay uses of the word ‘sign’ – nor lay ideas of what a sign might 
be – for its critique. Harris’ “integrational” theory of communication needs to 
be seen as an alternative to the so-called “segregational” theories that Harris 
has identified (Harris 1996). The problem with decontextualization is first and 
foremost of a theoretical nature, i.e. it relates to the philosophies of language 
adopted by disciplines interested in theorizing communication. Integrationism 
aims to critically engage with these philosophies.
 Peirce’s categorization of signs into firstness, secondness and thirdness would 
appear to be more compatible with Harrisian semiology, emphasizing different 
context-dependent kinds of signhood. Thus Cobley (2016: 11) explains firstness 
as the realm of the possible (‘feeling’), such as a vague taste or a sense of a colour. 
Secondness is the realm of the brutally factual, as when closing the door an object 
in the way prevents its complete closing, which gives rise to understanding the 
relation between closing the door and its failure to close. Lastly, thirdness is the 
realm of general laws, or the virtual, such as the law that heavy objects in the 
way can prevent doors from closing. The integrationist will certainly not disagree 
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with the idea that signs may differ phenomenologically, but will point out that 
human sign-making always occurs as part of an activity – and human activities 
are invariably constrained by macrosocial, circumstantial and biomechanical 
factors. From an integrational perspective, it is not enough to specify the situation 
or context (closing a door and its being stuck because of a heavy object in the 
way): these situations do occur, as our personal experience (or our imagining such 
scenarios) amply testifies, but they always involve concrete individuals in concrete 
circumstances (even in the case of scholars introducing them to exemplify a type 
of situation), i.e. individuals doing something as part of an activity (whatever the 
activity, or activities, may be). The activities may involve several people in various 
ways, or may involve a single person. They may of course involve non-human 
creatures as well (walking the dog, feeding the cat, etc.). The contextualizations 
which make the signs possible, however, are always the result of individuals ‘doing’ 
something in unique situations, i.e. a phenomenological typology of signs inevitably 
distorts the sign-making experience here-and-now. There is nothing wrong with 
generalizations of experience (e.g. when we establish general laws of how objects 
‘behave’ in relation to each other). The problem that integrationists have on that 
score has to do with their conviction that human signs only exist to integrate first-
order communicational activities, whereas the Peircean sign model caters to both 
human and non-human activities. When it comes to simple life forms, activities are 
reducible to behaviour which, though conditioned, is regular and predictable. 
 Unlike semiotics, integrationist semiology theorizes linguistic signs as radi-
cally indeterminate, including the radical indeterminacy of the metalanguage. 
That semiotics would not want to proclaim form and meaning to be radically 
indeterminate (in the Harrisian sense) is perfectly understandable: a general study 
of the signs in/of life – the ‘life science’ that biosemiotics aspires to be – relies on 
identifying (species-specific) signs in particular instances. There is an interesting 
parallel between integrationism and semiotics, though: while integrationists 
explain what a sign is in relation to the individual human sign-maker (hence the 
impossibility of a decontextualized definition), the semiotician will explain what a 
sign is in relation to the species and its umwelt. The difference, however, lies in the 
ambitious task set by global semiotics to understand what the signs mean for the 
different living organisms. Radical indeterminacy (in the Harrisian sense) would 
be a nonsensical theoretical concept for the general study of life forms: in fact, 
biosemiotics takes as its starting point that any stimulus can be a sign to any living 
organism. On this view, signs basically take over, becoming “actors” and “begetting 
life”, while the living organisms themselves (including cognitively sophisticated 
beings like Homo sapiens) become “interpreters” of those acting signs. Anything, 
therefore, acts as a sign as long as it finds an interpreter to which to attach itself: 
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thus even an animal carcass is a sign, though itself lifeless, because it will inevitably 
find its interpreters, i.e. it exists as different ‘objects’ in the various species-specific 
umwelten. No sign can exist without its object, which in turn cannot exist without 
its interpretant, but there is still the reality of the “sign-potential”.
 The biosemiotic view, it needs to be admitted, is an appealing one for any-
body who views humanism and its core beliefs with skepticism (because of its 
Eurocentrism, its patriarchal ideology, its glorification of humans, particularly of 
Westerners, etc.). Biosemiotics purports to free the study of life of (humanistic) 
ideologies by granting signs and communication their rightful place in intellectual 
and scientific discourse – a discourse that no longer lends itself to discrimination 
against species, races, ethnicities, sexes or languages. Instead it proclaims 
that without signs and without communication nothing could have come into 
existence (the universe – planet Earth – human beings). Signs, together with 
communication, are at the forefront of the biosemiotic approach (as they are in 
integrationism): adopting a majestic – almost God-like – view, human life must 
ultimately appear as merely one particular biological development on the life 
continuum, albeit one of a particular kind. Hence the biosemiotician’s conclusion 
that humans are different both in degree and kind (Cobley 2016: 43). 
 From the point of view of biosemiotics, the semiological fallacy consists in 
starting its investigation of signs by treating them as part of social (i.e. human) 
life, as proposed by Saussure, i.e. treating signs as belonging to the human um-
welt exclusively and declaring the sign as synonymous with the linguistic sign. 
Biosemiotics proposes a reversal of the humanist priorities, namely a more global 
(and hence less biased) investigation of signs, which calls for a very different 
conclusion: humans are only recent sign-users (adding linguistic signs to the 
rich pre-human sign repertoire), which is why the study of signs (including 
human signs) requires a biological  – not a cultural  – approach (i.e. one that 
treats culture as part of biology). Biosemiotics does not reject the first-person 
experience account – Cobley (2016: 42) refers to it as “quasi-knowing” – but 
insists that once we see that the human umwelt is the human reality, we shall 
want to “move beyond” our personal experience of what a sign is (an incomplete 
view). An epistemological framework that aims to ‘know’, albeit still as humans, 
what non-human creatures ‘know’ has to rely on a third-person perspective. This, 
in turn, makes it indispensable for the Peircean semiotician to think of signs as 
other-representations, which follows directly from the position that objects ‘mean’ 
differently to different organisms (i.e. the objects have to be mediated via signs in 
order for them to ‘mean’). Adopting a Peircean sign model, even the linguistic sign 
can be shown to function surrogationally as part of that complex of activities that 
Saussure termed ‘parole’.
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 The reasons for an integrationist objection to the substitute sign (including the 
Peircean triadic variant) should have become evident by now: only by theorizing 
signs as existing in virtue of their integrational function, as Harris does, can 
decontextualization be avoided. For a sign to be made it has to be contextualized. 
This personal sign cannot become impersonal for the sake of disciplinary 
demands, such as extending the study of signs to all living organisms. Both 
Sebeok (1979) and Deely (2009) have argued that Saussure’s semiology can be 
incorporated into the global study of signs (semiotics), which is possible because 
Saussure’s sign conception is based on the abstract sign as much as the Peircean 
conception. Integrational semiology, on the other hand, is incompatible with 
both Saussurean semiology and Peircean semiotics. Only integrationists insist 
that the signs of human communication are personal ones, i.e. creations ex nihilo. 
Bacteria and fungi, for example, are not ‘persons’. If they make (or use) signs, as 
the semiotician claims, they are certainly ‘their’ signs, but as a consequence of 
being ‘theirs’ humans cannot really ‘know’ them. 
 It might be objected here that it all depends on how one defines ‘knowing’. 
Agreed. This is itself a semiological question. However, an integrationist episte-
mology (Harris 2009b) cannot dispense with the radical indeterminacy of the 
sign: knowledge is thus never something external to the knower but something 
generated by the sign-maker. Knowledge is always contextualized, never con-
textless. It requires human signs and cannot be detached from personal 
experience. The integrationist conception of the sign, if accepted, does not allow 
one to provide a definition of non-human signs (as, then, the question what counts 
as a ‘sign’ becomes nonsensical), nor does it allow one to treat them as somewhat 
comparable to human integrated signs. The signs (stimuli) that bacteria ‘interpret’ 
are nothing like the signs that require the complex integration of the here-and-
now with remembered past experience and anticipated future experience. The 
integrational sign and the substitute sign are incompatible, i.e. they go with two 
different conceptions of ‘communication’, which makes it incoherent, from an 
integrational perspective, to claim that humans and, say, bacteria both make ‘signs’. 
 Of course, it could be claimed that non-human animals also ‘integrate’, but 
if they do it is hardly something that we can ‘know’ about, given that there are 
no experiences to introspect. To say, in Uexküllian fashion, that the fly knows 
the table as a ‘landing-object’, or makes it one (Uexküll 1982) is to say that this 
‘thing’ becomes an ‘object’, which means that it is a sign for the fly in accordance 
with its Innenwelt (if it were not a sign, the table would not ‘mean’ anything to 
the fly). The integrationist argument, however, is that in the realm of animal 
communication our insights into signs must come from observation only. What 
we observe, therefore, is behaviour. Since signs are not external to the sign-maker, 
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how can we observe anything that directly pertains to sign-making? Integrationists 
take a sceptical position on signs as ‘actors’ in the universe, mainly due to their 
anthropocentric stance when it comes to signs and communication. There is a 
dilemma here: semiotics – like integrationism – rejects behaviourism, which it 
rightly sees as reductionist. Signs are more than mere behaviour. They concern 
meaning. While steering clear of claims that bacteria and fungi possess ‘minds’, 
biosemiotics insists that organisms ‘know’ objects whenever they ‘interpret’ them, 
which in turn presupposes signs and meaning-making. Although ‘knowing’, 
‘interpreting’, ‘meaning-making’ are human attributes (possibly including other 
animals supposed to have a ‘mind’), semiotics says of itself that it steers clear of 
anthropomorphism by freeing the sign from the semiologist’s grip and putting it 
where it rightfully belongs as a theoretical concept, namely (semiotic) biology.
5. The object-thing distinction
In Purely Objective Reality, John Deely (2009) resurrects the intriguing distinction 
between thing and object, together with the distinction between physical 
reality and objective reality. His approach being informed by biosemiotics, 
Deely rejects both naïve realism and nominalism. Building on the notion that 
the sign is constituted as a triadic relation, Deely affirms that reality is always 
‘objective’ because it is species-specific and thus constrained by the sign-making 
capabilities of a species and its sensoria. Deely’s account of how science turned 
to ‘things as they are’ (the physical environment) as its object of study and his 
critique of the failure on the part of scientists and philosophers to understand 
the difference between objects and things bears some interesting parallels with 
Roy Harris’ argument as presented in The Semantics of Science (Harris 2005). As 
Deely rightly argues, only humans are capable of distinguishing between objects 
considered in relation to him/herself and objects considered in relation to the 
objects themselves, i.e. to contemplate them for their own sake (i.e. as ‘things’) 
and to treat them as ‘objectively’ given (whereby ‘objectivity’ in the latter sense 
is to be distinguished from ‘objectivity’ in the biosemiotic sense). The cardinal 
mistake made by orthodox science, for Deely (2009: 167), lies in assuming that 
the physical environment is the same regardless of the creatures that inhabit it. 
Deely does not deny the reality of the physical universe (as a thing): he states, in 
fact, that there is a physical universe which is the same for all types of organisms, 
but adds that this physical environment is different from the points of view of 
the various umwelten. Deely’s crucial insight here is that science and semiotics 
differ in their conceptions of reality. What science fails to see is that signs “are 
140 Adrian Pablé
indifferent to reality in the physical sense”; in other words, biosemiotics cannot 
adopt a ‘scientific’ point of view, as it corresponds to no living organism’s point of 
view. In this view, therefore, science could be seen as a branch of anthroposemiotics, 
i.e. the institutionalized human activity of investigating a sign-less reality through 
signs (science commmunication in its various forms), a reality made of ‘things’, 
not ‘objects’. However, as the semiotician would point out, it does not follow from 
this that biosemiotics is unscientific. Biosemiotics sees itself as the superior science 
compared to orthodox science because (unlike science) it realizes that the study of 
‘things as they are’ is intrinsically part of the human umwelt, a stance made possible 
semiotically by human linguistic reflexivity. Biosemiotics investigates objective 
worlds, “the order that is created above all by the action of signs” (Deely 2009: 173). 
Deely (2009: 168) also points out that reality and unreality are both part of objective 
(species-specific) reality, while unreality does not partake of physical reality. 
 Deely’s philosophical approach is grounded in a Peircean ‘realism’: he speaks 
of “hardcore” reality in connection with subjectivities (or substances), which are 
independent of human opinion. Biological relations are hardcore. For example, 
Deely (2009: 152) remembers the case of a girl in America (whose mother had 
passed away) who thought the man she lived with was her father, but, Deely tells 
us, she was actually the biological daughter of a man in Europe, who did not even 
know about her existence. As Deely points out, there exists an intersubjective 
relationship between the father (the man in Europe) and his daughter: two 
subjectivities whose connection with each other is not sign-mediated. The girl’s 
belief that the man she calls her father is really her biological father, on the 
other hand, is part of the objective world, i.e. there is no intersubjective reality 
linking these two subjectivities: there is only a triadic relation in the form of a 
sign, an object and an interpretant. However, as far as that girl was concerned – 
the integrationist objection might run – the man she lived with was her father. 
From the point of view of an integrational epistemology, it was not something 
she thought – she knew it. The question of ‘unreality’ probably never arose in her 
mind. Should she find out the ‘truth’ one day, that obviously requires a radical 
revision of her past beliefs, but it does not retrospectively downgrade what she 
knew at the time to mere belief. 
 For biosemiotics, the human objective world (qua systematic belief system) 
offers possibilities for a sustained critique: ideologies like humanism (comprising 
anthropocentrism, race and gender discrimination, among other things) can be 
shown to be mere constructs, unlike the non-human objective world, which cannot 
be linguistically constructed (and hence cannot be ideological). What humanists 
say about the non-human objective world, however, is ideological – from the point 
of view of biosemiotics – and so is idealism (in its denial of hardcore reality).
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 Deely chastizes orthodox science for failing to distinguish between objects 
and things, but his is not a critique of the language of science. The latter is part 
of the human objective world, while the ‘things’ themselves are not. In turn, in 
The Semantics of Science, Harris (2005) criticizes the worldview sustaining the 
scientific notion of ‘objective’ reality (in the non-biosemiotic sense), which 
constitutes at the same time his critique of the ‘Language Myth’, which he sees as 
operating in “supercategories” like Science (and equally present in Art, History 
and Religion). The Harrisian argument is that science owes its existence to the 
availability of a specific kind of language and a macrosocially institutionalized 
discourse, upon which membership (and excommunication) ultimately rest. As 
Harris shows, science tacitly relies on a “surrogationalist semantics”, itself divided 
into two distinct branches: ‘reocentrism’ and ‘psychocentrism’. It is chiefly the 
reocentric conception of how words get their meaning, namely by ‘standing for’ 
the things they are names of, that prevails in orthodox science. It is a language-
philosophy that ties in with the view that the world exists mind-independently and 
that knowledge of the things that populate the universe (natural units) requires 
knowledge of the correct linguistic labels, by means of which things can be 
identified as the same over and over again. Both types of knowledge are assumed 
to be context-independent. It has been the scientist’s job to continuously map the 
universe, as scientific knowledge progresses, whereby one name gets replaced by 
a new name (or the name remains but is semantically redefined). Name variation, 
within a ‘reocentric’ model of language, must be handled with suspicion and 
possibly dissolved, i.e. cases in which one and the same thing is known by different 
names, as well as cases in which the same name refers to different things (Pablé 
2009). In either case a disruption of the reocentric ideal (one name–one referent) 
has occurred. Some names must therefore be rejected (scraped off the linguistic 
map) on the grounds that they are psychocentrically defined, i.e. they merely “stand 
for” ideas in the mind. From a Harrisian point of view, either surrogationalist 
conception of meaning is fallacious for its failure to treat words in relation to 
the activities they integrate, which is why (for Harris) not even scientific terms 
are determinate in form or meaning. This critique of the various (segregational) 
philosophies of language is unique to integrationism and the reasons for it, as we 
have seen, are semiological. 
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6. Communication as a universal phenomenon?
The present paper has argued that semiotics and semiology are incompatible, but 
not primarily for the reasons given by semiotics. The fact that semiotics believes 
it can include semiology suggests that Peirce and Saussure were like-minded in at 
least one respect when presenting their programmes for a doctrine of signs and 
a science of signs, respectively: they both thought that signs exist as abstractions, 
though neither seems to have realized how strongly this metaphysical assumption 
was due to literacy, or what Harris (1998: 123) calls the fallacy of “scriptism”. On 
that score, both semiotics and semiology are products of a culture and society 
imbued with language mythical beliefs. It is interesting to note that in their book 
on alternative Southern epistemologies, Pennycook and Makoni (2019) extensively 
discuss ‘languages’ (count) and ‘language’ (mass) as ideological products of the 
Global North, but theirs is not a critique of the metaphysical notion that signs 
exist as abstractions, which is clearly a product of Western intellectual thought 
(Harris 2009c). Only Harrisian semiology rejects the reality of abstractions and 
instead recognizes personal experience as the guide to theorizing communication 
(in a general sense), and in doing so, I have argued elsewhere, transcends 
ethnocentrism (Pablé 2019b). While not denying that non-human beings engage 
in communication, integrationism constitutes a theory of human communication. 
 Taking a broader theoretical perspective on communication, as semiotics does, 
necessitates a biological view of ourselves and of our mental activities, which come 
to be seen as endosemiotic processes. Thus what I call ‘my mind’ is ultimately 
caused by the micro-organisms that make it possible for me to live (and to have 
a mind). However, biosemiotics, like evolutionary biology, requires that we take 
a detached view of ourselves in order to see ourselves as ‘animals’ who happened 
to develop linguistic communication. The integrationist, on the other hand, does 
not consider ‘language’ to be what makes us human. One way to define what 
makes us human, arguably, is to say that we are persons (not in a legal sense), 
each with his/her unique personal history. It follows that each of us has his/her 
own communicational biography, which comprises so much more than merely 
‘linguistic’ communication. Deely (2009: 155), in turn, suggests that everything 
communicates (rocks, stars, plants, etc.). This stance is the very opposite of 
Harris’. Both have their appeals, but require different philosophies of language. 
Any discipline centred on the sign as its primary theoretical concept operates on 
certain linguistic beliefs (Pablé 2016). The distinction between ‘real definition’, i.e. 
the thing a word stands for, and ‘lexical definition’, i.e. what a word means (Harris, 
Hutton 2007), poses a major challenge in this respect which calls for a clear 
position. Harris (2003: 67) called the conflation of this distinction “deplorable”, 
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adding that it partly accounts for the “morass in which modern semantics has 
been floundering for at least hundred years”. The distinction is a crucial one – in 
fact, ontologies and epistemologies will vary depending on the position taken.2
References
Cobley, Paul 2011a. Mythbusting. Language Sciences 33(4): 511–516. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
langsci.2011.04.006
Cobley, Paul 2011b. Sebeok’s panopticon. In: Cobley, Paul; Deely, John; Kull, Kalevi; Petrilli, 
Susan (eds.), Semiotics Continues to Astonish: Thomas A. Sebeok and the Doctrine of Signs. 
(Semiotics, Communication and Cognition 7.) Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 85–114.
Cobley, Paul 2014. Codes and coding: Sebeok’s zoosemiotics and the dismantling of the fixed-
code fallacy. Semiotica 198: 33–45. https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2013-0100
Cobley, Paul 2016. Cultural Implications of Biosemiotics. (Biosemiotics 15.) Dordrecht: Springer.
Cobley, Paul 2017. Discussion: integrationism, anti-humanism and the suprasubjective. In: 
Pablé, Adrian (ed.), Critical Humanist Perspectives. London: Routledge, 267–284. https://
doi.org/10.4324/9781315621760-18
CP = Peirce, Charles Sanders. The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. (Hartshorne, 
Charles; Weiss, Paul, eds. 1931–1935; Burks, Arthur W., ed. 1958.) Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. [In-text references are to CP, followed by volume and paragraph numbers.]
Deacon, Terrence 1997. The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Human 
Brain. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Deely, John 2003. The word semiotics: Formation and origin. Semiotica 146: 1–49. https://doi.
org/10.1515/semi.2003.066
Deely, John 2009. Purely Objective Reality. (Semiotics, Communication and Cognition 4.) 
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Harris, Roy 1981. The Language Myth. London: Duckworth.
Harris, Roy 1996. Signs, Language and Communication. London: Routledge.
Harris, Roy 1998. Introduction to Integrational Linguistics. Oxford: Pergamon.
Harris, Roy 2003. History, Science and the Limits of Language. Shimla: Indian Institute for 
Advanced Study. 
Harris, Roy 2005. The Semantics of Science. London: Continuum.
Harris, Roy 2006. Integrational linguistics and semiology. In: Keith, Brown (ed.). Encyclopedia 
of Language and Linguistics. Oxford: Elsevier, 714–718. https://doi.org/10.1016/B0-08-
044854-2/04482-5
Harris, Roy 2009a. The integrational conception of the sign. In: Harris, Roy, Integrationist Notes 
and Papers 2006–2008. Gamlingay: Bright Pen, 61–82.
Harris, Roy 2009b. After Epistemology. Gamlingay: Authors Online.
Harris, Roy 2009c. Rationality and the Literate Mind. London: Routledge.
Harris, Roy 2010. Linguistic Inquiry. Unpublished manuscript.
Harris, Roy; Hutton, Christopher 2007. Definition in Theory and Practice. London: Continuum.
2 Acknowledgements. Th e author would like to thank Charlotte Conrad, Paul Cobley and 
Johan Siebers for comments on an earlier draft . 
144 Adrian Pablé
Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press.
Kull, Kalevi 2010. Umwelt and modelling. In: Cobley, Paul (ed.), The Routledge Companion to 
Semiotics. London: Routledge, 43–56.
Kull, Kalevi 2011. The architect of biosemiotics: Thomas A. Sebeok and biology. In: Cobley, 
Paul; Deely, John; Kull, Kalevi; Petrilli, Susan (eds.), Semiotics Continues to Astonish: 
Thomas A. Sebeok and the Doctrine of Signs. (Semiotics, Communication and Cognition 
7.) Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 223–250.
Pablé, Adrian 2009. The ‘dialect myth’ and socio-onomastics: The names of the castles of 
Bellinzona in an integrational perspective. Language and Communication 29(2): 152–165. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langcom.2008.12.004
Pablé, Adrian 2016. Global semiotics vs. human semiology. Chinese Semiotic Studies 12(1): 
25–43. https://doi.org/10.1515/css-2016-0004
Pablé, Adrian 2019a. In what sense is integrational theory lay-oriented? Notes on Harrisian 
core concepts and explanatory terminology. Language Sciences 72(1): 150–159. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.langsci.2018.10.001
Pablé, Adrian 2019b. Is a general non-ethnocentric theory of human communication 
possible? An integrationist approach. Lingua. Article 102735. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
lingua.2019.102735
Pablé, Adrian; Hutton, Christopher 2015. Signs, Meaning and Experience: Integrational 
Approaches to Linguistics and Semiotics. (Semiotics, Communication and Cognition 15.) 
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Pennycook, Alastair; Sinfree Makoni 2019. Innovations and Challenges in Applied Linguistics 
from the Global South. London: Routledge.
Petrilli, Susan 2011. About a master of signs starting from The Sign & Its Masters. In: Cobley, 
Paul; Deely, John; Kull, Kalevi; Petrilli, Susan (eds.), Semiotics Continues to Astonish: 
Thomas A. Sebeok and the Doctrine of Signs. (Semiotics, Communication and Cognition 
7.) Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 293–306.
Petrilli, Susan 2015. Language, communication, and speech: Human signs in global semiosis. 
Semiotica 204: 173–237. https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2014-0092
Petrilli, Susan; Ponzio, Augusto 2011. A tribute to Thomas A. Sebeok. In: Cobley, Paul; Deely, 
John; Kull, Kalevi; Petrilli, Susan (eds.), Semiotics Continues to Astonish: Thomas A. Sebeok 
and the Doctrine of Signs. (Semiotics, Communication and Cognition 7.) Berlin: De Gruyter 
Mouton, 307–330.
Saussure, Ferdinand de 1983. Course in General Linguistics. (Harris, Roy, trans.) London: 
Duckworth.
Sebeok, Thomas 1979. The Sign & Its Masters. Texas: The University of Texas Press.
Sebeok, Thomas 1986. I Think I Am a Verb. New York: Plenum Press. 
Uexküll, Jakob von 1982. The theory of meaning. Semiotica 42(1): 25–82. https://doi.
org/10.1515/semi.1982.42.1.25
 Integrating biosemiotics 145
Интегрирующие биосемиотики. С семиологической точки зрения 
Данная работа представляет собой исследование в области «философии семиотики». 
Она сосредоточена на критическом подходе к концепции знаков Пирса, которая 
лежит в основе биосемиотики и глобального взгляда на знаки. В настоящей работе 
рассматриваются вопросы, представляющие онтологический и эпистемологический 
интерес, с семиологической отправной точкой. Вдохновителем настоящей статьи 
служит интеграционизм Роя Харриса, подход к человеческому общению, отвергающий 
соссюрианскую семиологию  – общую цель семиотики Пирса. Интеграционизм 
объясняет знаки, связанные с человеческой деятельностью. Он разделяет с биосемио-
тикой представление о реальности как о видовой специфике, но занимает скептическую 
позицию в отношении исследования нечеловеческих знаков на том основании, что он 
подразумевает метаязык, невосприимчивый к радикальной неопределенности знака. 
Интеграционисты воспринимают эту неопределенность как отправную точку для своих 
размышлений о человеческом общении. 
Biosemiootika lõimimine: Semioloogilisest vaatevinklist
Käesolev artikkel on uurimus „semiootika filosoofiast“. Selles keskendutakse ühele kriiti-
lisele viisile läheneda Peirce’i märgikontseptsioonile, mis on aluseks biosemiootika ning 
märkide globaalsest perspektiivist nägemisele. Selles käsitluses puudutatakse ontoloogilist ja 
epistemoloogilist huvi pakkuvaid küsimusi, võttes kasutusele selgelt semioloogilise mõõdupuu. 
Semioloogia, millest käesolev kriitika tõukub, on Roy Harrise integratsionism, lähenemine 
inimkommunikatsioonile, milles hüljatakse Saussure’i semioloogia kui Peirce’i semiootika 
tavaline märklaud. Integratsionism seletab märke seoses inimtegevustega. Biosemiootikaga 
jagab see seisukohta, et reaalsus on liigispetsiifiline, ent jääb skeptiliseks mitteinimmärkide 
uurimise suhtes põhjendusega, et sellega kaasneks metakeel, mis ei ole vastuvõtlik märgi 
radikaalse määramatuse suhtes. Integratsionistide jaoks on see määramatus lähtekoht, millelt 
reflekteerida inimkommunikatsiooni üle. 
